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“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments known the components of liberty in
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did
not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
As we enter 2011, progress on marijuana law reform in the U.S. is
mixed. At the state level, on the one hand, there is momentum.
Following California’s lead in 1996, fifteen states now allow the
medicinal use of marijuana.2 As for recreational use, although
California recently rejected Proposition 19 by a 54% to 46% margin,3
this ballot initiative thrust the issue to the forefront of national and
international political debate.4 Indeed, plans are already underway to
place similar yet refined measures on state ballots in 2012.5 As Richard
Lee, founder of Oaksterdam University and author of Proposition 19,
thus remarked, “over the course of the last year, it has become clear that

1. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
2. Devlin Houser, Arizona Narrowly Approves Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2010.
3. See John Hoeffel & Maria L. LaGanga, Youth Vote Falters; Prop. 19 Falls Short, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010. Proposition 19, the “Regulate, Control, and Tax Cannabis Act of
2010,” would have changed California law from a regime of marijuana prohibition to one of
marijuana regulation and taxation.
4. See, e.g., Joe Klein, It’s High Time, TIME, Apr. 13, 2009, at 19; Timothy Egan, Reefer
Gladness, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010; Jeffrey A. Miron, Drugs and Conservatives Should Go
Together, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010; George Soros, Why I Support Legal Marijuana,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 26, 2010; Ed Kilgore, Fired Up? THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 26, 2010;
Nicholas D. Kristof, End the War on Pot, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010; High Time to Legalise
Marijuana; Californians Should back Proposition 19, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 28, 2010;
Andrew Ferguson, How Marijuana Got Mainstreamed, TIME, Nov. 22, 2010, at 30. As one
journalist writes, “polls indicate Prop. 19 is by far the most recognizable measure on the ballot. It’s
also been drawing international headlines because it would make California the first place in the
United States to legalize recreational pot.” Kevin Fagan, Prop. 19: Fight over Pot Starts to Heat
Up, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 24, 2010.
5. See Stephen Gutwillig, History is on Proposition 19’s Side, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov.3,
2010; Henry K. Lee, Legal Pot Backers Vow to Try Again in 2012, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Nov. 4, 2010; Kevin Fagan, Defeat of Pot Measure Shows Divide Lingers, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 2010, and www.mpp.org.
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the legalization of marijuana is no longer a question of if but a question
of when.”6
Notwithstanding such momentum at the state level, however, the
prospects for reform at the federal level appear dismal for the near
future. For its part, Congress has consistently refused even to instruct
the DEA not to harass sick patients in states with medical marijuana
laws.7 For his part, President Obama has sent mixed signals on
marijuana policy. On the one hand, he announced in 2009 that so long
as state medical marijuana laws are faithfully observed, there would be
no DEA intervention.8 In 2010, by contrast, when polls leading up to the
election indicated that Proposition 19 might succeed, Attorney General
Eric Holder threatened to enforce federal marijuana prohibition if it did.9
With Proposition 19’s defeat, of course, the Administration dodged
a bullet. Yet Obama almost certainly seeks reelection, and few
politicians of either party will touch the marijuana issue.10 Especially
since the new Republican-controlled House of Representatives is even
less likely to spur reform in this area than did the recent Democratcontrolled House, it seems clear that for the time being, federal
marijuana prohibition11 marches on.
If Obama is reelected, however, the situation transforms. Since the
Twenty-second Amendment bars him from a third term,12 and his future
would be quite secure, he would be free to speak the truth on this issue,
which includes the following: beyond its economic13 and social14 costs,
6. Kevin Fagan, ‘Resounding’ Rejection for Marijuana Measure, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Nov. 3, 2010; See also Ethan Nadelmann, Marijuana Legalization: Not If, But When,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 2010.
7. See, e.g., Hinchey Encouraged by Record House Support for Medical Marijuana; Vows to
Keep Fighting for Amendment, STATES NEWS SERVICE, July 25, 2007.
8. See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Obama Administration to Stop Raids on Medical
Marijuana Dispensers, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009.
9. See Adam Nagourney, U.S. Will Enforce Marijuana Laws, State Vote Aside, N. Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2010, The Feds Say No Way, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, and The Feds Weigh in
on Proposition 19, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 27, 2010, at A15.
10. None of those who ran for Governor of California in 2010, for example, supported
Proposition 19. See Bob Egelko, Legal Pot a Tough Sell in (2010 California Gubernatorial) Race,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 8, 2009 and Joe Garofoli, Bid to Legalize Pot is Counter to U.S.
Trend, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 5, 2010.
11. The statutory basis of this prohibition, enacted in 1970, is the Comprehensive Drug
Prevention and Control Act, popularly called the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 - 904
(2009). The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) classifies marijuana as a Schedule One controlled
substance, which means that in Congress’ view, it has a high potential for abuse, no officially
accepted medicinal uses, and no safe level of use under medical supervision.
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
13. As a single illustration, in a report signed by over 500 economists, including three Nobel
Laureates, Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron estimated that ending cannabis prohibition would save
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marijuana prohibition burdens a range of constitutional interests,
including those arising under the First,15 Fourth,16 Fifth,17 Sixth,18

$7.7 billion per year in government expenditures on its enforcement ($5.3 billion accruing to State
and local governments, while $2.4 billion accruing to the U.S. government). He also estimated that
ending the prohibition would yield tax revenue of $2.4 billion annually if cannabis were taxed like
all other goods and $6.2 billion annually if it were taxed at rates comparable to those on alcohol and
tobacco. Jeffrey A. Miron, The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition (June 2005),
http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/endorsers.html.
14. The rule of law and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system are undermined, for
example, when government promulgates misleading propaganda to justify the enforcement of
widely ignored laws.
See generally, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.DEA.gov (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) and OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, http://www.ONDCP.gov (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). Moreover, the black market in
marijuana generates vast profits which make the violent gangs that control that market attractive to
young people. It also gives public officials, with their typically modest salaries, incentives to
cooperate with the underground market. Beyond this, families and individual lives are destroyed
when nonviolent cannabis offenders are thrust into a world of prison gangs, sexual violence, hard
drugs, and learned criminality. These problems are worsened by prison overcrowding, which forces
the early release of violent offenders to make room for nonviolent ones. And perhaps the most
tragic social cost of this prohibition is that it is largely a war on racial minorities. It is well
documented that the U.S. has the world’s highest prison population rate, that it has widely
disproportionate felony conviction and incarceration rates by race, and that the picture is even worse
for minorities with respect to drug crimes in particular. See generally JUDGE RUDOLPH J. GERBER,
LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND PROHIBITION POLITICS (2004); JOEL
MILLER, BAD TRIP: HOW THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS IS DESTROYING AMERICA (2004); ERIC
SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK
MARKET (2003); JUDGE JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2001); William F. Buckley,
Mayor Kurt Schmoke, & Police Chief Joseph McNamara, The War on Drugs is Lost, in MIKE
GRAY, BUSTED 198-209 (2002) [hereinafter, M. GRAY I].
15. As for freedom of speech, see Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002);
Gerber, supra note 14, at 121-30, and Graham Boyd & Jack Hitt, This is Your Bill of Rights, in M.
GRAY I, supra note 14, at 149. As for religious freedom, it has been argued that since adult
marijuana use promotes spiritual centering and insight, it should be protected under the free exercise
clause. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mallan, 86 HAW. 440, 444 (1998); Jacob Sullum, Spiritual Highs and
Legal Blows: The Power and Peril of Religious Exemptions from Drug Prohibition, in REASON,
June 2007, at 43-54, available at http://reason.com/news/show/119721.html; Empt. Div. v. Smith,
485 U.S. 660 (1988), however, held that the drug war trumps free exercise.
16. See, e.g., Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can the Fourth Amendment
Survive the Supreme Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631 (2004); Frank Rudy Cooper,
The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling, and
Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); Dave Kopel, Smash-up Policing: When Law Enforcement
Goes Military, in M. GRAY I, supra note 14, at 155-58 (militarization of law enforcement); Jim
Dwyer, Casualty in the War on Drugs, in M. GRAY I, supra note 14, at 159-63 (distortion of police
practices).
17. The widely used practice of civil asset forfeiture in drug cases, for example, presents
questions under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270 (1996),
and the Takings Clause, see Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996). See also Boyd & Hitt,
supra note 15, at 151-52.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/8

4

Carcieri: Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Drug War

13_CARCIERI_WESTERN.DOCM

2011]

OBAMA, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE DRUG WAR

2/10/2011 2:04 PM

307

Eighth,19 Tenth,20 and Fifteenth21 Amendments.22 As a constitutional
lawyer, further, the President knows that these problems may be but
symptoms of an underlying constitutional infirmity, one rooted primarily
in the Fourteenth Amendment. This article is written to help clarify the
full range of understanding Obama would bring to a second term.
Specifically, I defend two related, contested theses.
My core thesis, to which this article is primarily devoted, is a
jurisprudential claim: contrary to state and lower federal court rulings,
marijuana prohibition is subject to strict judicial scrutiny under leading

18. The use of anonymous informants in drug cases, for example, undermines the right to
confront one’s accusers. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Boyd & Hitt, supra note
15, at 152.
19. Mandatory minimum sentences for possession or sale undermine the proportionality of
punishment to offense, raising an issue of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., United States v.
Strahan, 565 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. O’Dell, 320 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir.,
2003); Boyd and Hitt, supra note 15, at 152-53; but see Linda Greenhouse, Justice Restore Judges’
Control over Sentencing, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at A1.
20. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court held that Congress’ commerce power
trumps the traditional police power of States, rooted in the Tenth Amendment, to regulate intrastate
activity for the health and welfare of their citizens. See generally Martin D. Carcieri, Gonzales v.
Raich: Congressional Tyranny and Irrelevance in the War on Drugs, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1131
(2007); Ilya Slomin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 (2006); Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the
States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1793-1800 (2003).
21. The Fifteenth Amendment guarantees voting rights regardless of race, yet “[t]hirteen
percent of all adult black men—1.4 million—are disenfranchised, representing one-third of the total
disenfranchised population and reflecting a rate of disenfranchisement that is seven times the
national average. Election voting statistics offer an approximation of the political importance of
black disenfranchisement: 1.4 million black men are disenfranchised compared to 4.6 million black
men who voted in 1996.” Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 8 (Human Rights Watch & The Sentencing Project,
1998).
22. These arguments have been made elsewhere. Beyond the sources already referenced. See,
e.g., Norm Stamper, America’s Drug War and the Right to Privacy, 68 MONT. L. REV. 285 (2007);
Andrew Koppelman, Drug Policy and the Liberal Self, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 279 (2006); Gerald G.
Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs and the War on
Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 753 (2006); Roger Pilon, Tenants, Students, and Drugs: A Comment
on the War on the Rule of Law, CATO, http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2002/pilon.pdf; Erik Luna,
Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753 (2002); Steven Duke, The Drug War and the
Constitution in AFTER PROHIBITION: AN ADULT APPROACH TO DRUG POLICIES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 41-59 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2000); Robert Sweet & Edward Harris, Moral and
Constitutional Considerations in Support of the Decriminalization of Drugs, in HOW TO LEGALIZE
DRUGS 430-84 (Jefferson M. Fish ed., 1998); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on
Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 245 (1994); Paul Finkelman,
The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL L. REV. 1389, 1399
(1993); Dan Baumann, The Drug War and Civil Liberties, THE NATION, June 29, 1992; Steven
Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
889 (1987).
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relevant U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.23 I support this thesis
primarily by showing that under the Fourteenth Amendment, bodily
autonomy—i.e., the control over the borders and contents of one’s body
burdened by laws like marijuana prohibition—is a fundamental right,
and that the Court has thus established a presumption in its favor,
especially for adults in the home. I then reinforce this thesis with three
further arguments: (1) marijuana prohibition violates “justice as
regularity,”24 (2) marijuana prohibition satisfies the “suspect class”
trigger of strict scrutiny,25 and (3) bodily autonomy is closely analogous
to the fundamental right of free speech. In sum, I argue that all roads of
constitutional analysis lead to strict scrutiny of marijuana prohibition.
My second thesis, resting largely on the first, is a policy claim: if
reelected, Obama will be inclined, and ought, to urge Congress to end
federal marijuana prohibition, letting States go their own way within
federal guidelines.26 As President, he knows that if he is convinced, on
both policy and constitutional grounds, that the law must be changed, he
need not wait for the Court to act—or more accurately, react. Especially
if the current pace of state marijuana law reform continues through 2012,
Obama’s recommendation will have broad support by the time he
delivers his 2013 State of the Union address.
An application of strict scrutiny to marijuana prohibition is the
subject of another article. Here I simply show that the President has
ample reason under well-settled law to conclude that this prohibition is
properly subject to that high standard. It may be that prohibition of
cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine could survive strict scrutiny.
These too are the subjects of other articles. Obama takes the rule of law
seriously, however, and he would have grave doubts that marijuana
prohibition could pass an honest application of strict scrutiny, in turn
prompting him to urge Congress to end this costly war.

23. The meaning and significance of strict scrutiny will be presented below.
24. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207-08 (Rev. Ed. 1999) [hereinafter TJ].
25. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the precise question of whether
marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment by virtue of
burdening the fundamental right of bodily autonomy. Raich, 545 U.S. at 2, 32. (2005) focuses on
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause to preempt contrary state marijuana laws, and United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 494-95 (2001) is a statutory
interpretation of the CSA.
26. This would require removing marijuana from Schedule One of the CSA and could include
such federal restrictions on state law as bans on advertising of marijuana, sale to children, driving
under the influence of marijuana, public use of marijuana, etc.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF BODILY AUTONOMY
A.

Introduction

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “no State . . . shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”27 The President has written that he considers these provisions
to be among the Constitution’s most important.28 He knows, after all,
that civil liberty is ultimately fused with equality—that where the law
creates a presumption of liberty, each person has a vital interest in not
having his liberty denied while others are allowed an equal or more
harmful liberty.29 As Professor Tribe thus recently observed, substantive
due process “is a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far
from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are
profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix. It is a single, unfolding
tale of equal liberty . . . .”30
In this light, it is not surprising that due process and equal
protection analyses blend into each other. Both start with the premise
that one challenging a law as an unconstitutional violation of his rights
ordinarily has the presumption against him. So long as government can
show a legitimate interest or end in enacting the law, that is, that the law
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
28. See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 90 (2006).
29. TJ, supra note 24, at 209.
30. Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). This view is confluent with that of Rawls, whose
equal liberty principle is the fundamental norm of a just constitution. See TJ, supra note 24, at 53.
Given the stature and legitimacy of Rawls’ work, I shall draw upon it at several points. I should thus
say briefly why I think the President would be receptive to guidance from Rawls. Obama is a
lawyer, to begin, steeped in the law of contracts. His view of a vibrant social contract as the
essential foundation for political rights and obligations in a just society is thus not surprising. While
the strengths of utilitarianism and intuitionism are plain for the President to see, further, he can also
easily grasp their fatal limitations as overarching principles of justice. Given his command of the
sources and structure of American law—the relationship among foundational principles, a
constitution, statutory law, judicial and administrative decision making—he would find the four
stage sequence and lexical ordering of the principles of justice valuable tools that invite application
of those principles to concrete policy, legal, and constitutional problems. As a Democrat on the
moderate political left, further, Obama embraces principles of equal liberty and fair equality of
opportunity, rejecting conservative and libertarian claims that mere formal equality of opportunity
yields a just and stable social order. As for the difference principle, finally, not only do Obama’s
speeches, writings, and lawmaking efforts evince a genuine concern for the least advantaged of all
races, but his life story exemplifies the fact, underscored by Rawls, that least advantaged status is no
mere function of race. See generally TJ, supra note 24; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A
RESTATEMENT (2001) [hereinafter, JF]; see also JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, READING OBAMA:
DREAMS, HOPES, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 89-110 (2011).
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is “rationally related” to advancing that interest, it will be upheld. This
ends/means test, embodying a presumption for government and against
the individual, is called rational basis scrutiny.31
In some cases, however, the Court has found either that the right
burdened by a challenged law is “fundamental”32 or that a classification
the law employs is “suspect.”33 In either case, it applies “strict
scrutiny,”34 and the presumption shifts to favor the individual.35 While
the law might still survive constitutional challenge, government now has
an uphill battle: it needs not simply a legitimate interest in enacting the
law, but a compelling one.36 It must have, we might say, not just a
reason, but a very good reason. Further, the law as a means must be not
just rationally related to advancing the interest, but “narrowly tailored”
to doing so.37 There must be not just a plausible link between means and
ends, in other words, but a close, efficient, causal link—one that is
neither too over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.38 On both the ends and

31. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); United States
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980); WILLIAM COHEN, DAVID DANELSKI, & DAVID A.
YALOF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 984 (6th ed. 2007).
This general presumption in favor of the constitutionality of governmental action, it must be
observed, is at it must be. If government did not usually enjoy this presumption, the political
branches could be brought to a standstill by litigation forcing them to defend all their actions under
strict scrutiny. In effect, this would be government by judiciary, which is antithetical to the
republican government the U.S. Constitution creates.
32. The seminal case is United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
Since then, the Court has recognized as fundamental such interests as marriage and procreation,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); voting, Harper v. Virgina State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 670 (1966); and interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
33. The quintessential suspect classification the Court has recognized, also rooted in United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), is race. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9, 11 (1967). Beginning in the
1970’s the Court developed intermediate scrutiny to test gender classifications, which were
considered “quasi-suspect.” See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
34. Justice Douglas introduced this term in Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
35. William Cohen, David Danelski, & David A. Yalof, Constitutional Law: Civil Rights and
Individual Liberties 984-85 (6th ed. 2007).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cal., 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2752 (2007).
38. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.39 (1979);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003); Cuellar v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 1994, 2004 (2008).
Legislative means are underinclusive with regard to legislative ends where they fail to include
within their reach activity that threatens those ends. They are overinclusive, conversely, where they
include within their reach activity that does not threaten those ends. Government being imperfect
by definition, the fit between ends and means could never, and need never, be perfect. Where strict
scrutiny applies, however, there is far less tolerance for overinclusion and underinclusion than under
intermediate or rational basis scrutiny. See generally, Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and
Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447 (1989).
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means portions of the analysis, a court applying strict scrutiny is
skeptical of, not deferential to, government’s arguments.39
B.

Core Thesis: Bodily Autonomy and the Fourteenth Amendment
1. Bodily Autonomy as a Fundamental Right

Since the 1980’s, writes Professor Post, the Court has developed
two approaches to identifying fundamental rights in its substantive due
process jurisprudence—the traditional approach and the autonomy
approach.40 The former is drawn originally from Palko v. Connecticut41
and embodied more recently in Washington v. Glucksberg.42 Beyond the
rule that an asserted fundamental right must be “deeply rooted in the
Nation’s history and tradition” as well as “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,” Glucksberg demands a “careful description” of the
right.43 Relying on this traditional formulation, state courts and lower
federal courts have long held that laws criminalizing the possession or
use of marijuana, even by adults in private, burden no fundamental right,
and so need only pass rational basis scrutiny.44 As the Hawaii Supreme
Court has written, for example,
We cannot say that smoking marijuana is a part of the “traditions and
collective conscience of our people.” In Hawai’i, possession of
marijuana has been illegal since 1931 . . . . In the rest of the United
States, the possession and/or use of marijuana, even in small quantities,
is almost universally prohibited. Therefore, tradition appears to be in
favor of the prohibition against possession and use of marijuana . . . .
Furthermore, we cannot say that the principles of liberty and justice
underlying our civil and political institutions are violated by marijuana
possession laws. We dare say that liberty and justice can exist in spite

39. See generally Craig R. Ducat, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: POWERS OF
GOVERNMENT 86-89 (9th ed. 2009). Nonetheless, to be clear, government sometimes prevails even
under strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003).
40. See Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 89 (2003).
41. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
42. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
43. Id. at 721.
44. See, e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (2007); Hawaii v. Sunderland, 115 Haw.
396, 409 (2007) (Moon, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Seeley v. Washington, 132 Wn.2d 776,
792 (1997); United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 547 (1982); NORML v. Bell, 488 F.Supp. 123,
134 (1980); Washington v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 336 (1980); Hamilton v. Florida, 366 So.2d 8, 10
(1978). A few state opinions have held marijuana prohibition unconstitutional, yet they either relied
on state constitutional privacy clauses or applied rational basis scrutiny in order to do so. See, e.g.,
Ravin v. Alaska, 537 P.2d 494 (1975); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91 (1972).
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of the prohibition against marijuana possession. Therefore, the
purported right to possess and use marijuana is not a fundamental
right and a compelling state interest is not required.”45

This conclusion, I submit, cannot withstand analysis. To see why,
we must evaluate bodily autonomy as a fundamental right under both
approaches identified by Post.
To begin, the phrases “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”46
and “neither justice nor liberty would exist if they were sacrificed”47 are
vague and abstract, and so provide little real guidance. They draw us out
onto Wittgenstein’s slippery ice, where language has little traction.48 At
best, they yield starting points for analysis. While a High Court may
“dare say that liberty and justice can exist in spite of (marijuana)
prohibition,”49 then, this is a meaningless claim that can be neither
proven nor disproven without heavy theoretical lifting. Reasonable
people differ on the meaning of such terms, so we are entitled to know
exactly how liberty can truly exist where the state can invade adults’
bodily autonomy, even in the home. We are entitled to know how
justice can really exist when adults who privately consume marijuana are
criminals while adults who consume far more dangerous substances like
alcohol and tobacco, even in public, are within their rights for reasons
that are widely understood.50 The Mallan court does not remotely speak
to such questions.
45. Hawaii v. Mallan, 86 Haw. 440, 445-46 (1998) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 443.
47. Id. at 444.
48. As he famously wrote,
it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up … and not go astray and imagine that we
have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to
describe with the means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s
web with our fingers…. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper
becomes the conflict between it and our requirement…. We have got on to slippery ice
where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just
because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to
the rough ground!
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I 39-40 (2001).
49. Mallan, 86 Haw. at 445.
50. It is widely understood, for example, that in a free society adults must presumptively be
free to consume what they wish, and that U.S. Prohibition was repealed as a constitutional and
policy failure. Beyond this, several authorities and leading studies declare that marijuana is far less
harmful than alcohol and tobacco. As one concluded, “[a]n objective consideration of marijuana
shows that it is responsible for less damage to the individual and society than are alcohol and
cigarettes.” Twentieth Annual Report of the Research Advisory Panel, California Research
Advisory Panel, 1989, http://www.norml.org. According to an article in The Lancet, a leading
British medical journal, “The smoking of cannabis, even long-term, is not harmful to health . . . . It
would be reasonable to judge cannabis as less of a threat . . . than alcohol or tobacco.”
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By contrast, the other aspect of the first prong of the traditional
approach—whether a right is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience

Deglamorising Cannabis, 346 THE LANCET, Nov. 14, 1995, at 1241; a study recently commissioned
by the U.S. government concluded that “users of marijuana are less likely to become dependent on
the drug in comparison to alcohol and nicotine.” Janet E. Joy, Stanley J. Watson, Jr., & John A
Benson, Jr., Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base, DIVISION OF NEUROSCIENCE
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 98 (1999). See also ERIC GOODE, BETWEEN
POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 155 (1997); Schlosser, supra note 14, at
74. Indeed, “[d]espite its use by millions of people over thousands of years, cannabis has never
caused a death.” Lester Grinspoon, Cannabis, the Wonder Drug, in THE DRUG LEGALIZATION
DEBATE 101-02 (James A. Inciardi, ed., 1999). By contrast, alcohol related deaths total more than
100,000 per year, and tobacco causes more than 400,000 U.S. deaths each year. See J.M. McGinnis
& W. H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, in 270 JAMA 2207, 2207-12 (1993);
Ting-Kai Li, M.D., Alcohol Use Disorders and Co-Occurring Conditions, THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
ON
DRUG
ABUSE
(last
viewed
Dec.
7,
2010),
http://archives.drugabuse.gov/meetings/ccc/plenary2.html; Glen R. Hanson, NIDA Acting Director,
NIDA's Continued Commitment, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (last viewed Dec. 7,
2010),
http://archives.drugabuse.gov/NIDA_notes/NNVol17N6/DirRepVol17N6.html.
Thus,
“[t]hough cannabis use is not without harm, especially for adolescents, as a source of danger it is
certainly trumped by alcohol, tobacco, reckless driving, criminality, and unsafe sexual behavior . . . .
This begs the question: why not remove the inconsistency by changing the pot laws?” ROBERT J.
MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES 345, 358 (2001). Beyond this, there is
evidence that marijuana is less dangerous than caffeine or fatty foods. As for coffee, one writer
observes that “the risks of caffeine are greater than THC in every way . . . . Caffeine is physically
addicting (with headache as the most often cited symptom) and can cause unnecessary stress,
lightheadedness, breathlessness, and an irregular heartbeat or much worse in larger-than-average
doses. Marijuana isn’t even remotely as dangerous—no deaths by overdose, no physical addiction,
and minimal health risks . . . .” Gable, in Fish, ed., supra note 22, at 406 (quoting D. Larsen). As
Gore and Earleywine write, further, “cannabis appears to have little addictive potential in the
opinion of most experts, particularly when compared to other common drugs, including caffeine.”
Robert Gore & Mitch Earleywine, Marijuana’s Perceived Addictiveness: A Survey of Clinicians
and Researchers, in POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION 185 (Mitch
Earleywine, ed., 2007). As for fatty foods, “in March, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention predicted that obesity will overtake smoking as the leading cause of preventable deaths
in the United States by next year if current trends continue.” Rashad & Michael Grossman, The
Economics of Obesity, 156 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 104. As Husak notes, “[P]eople overeat and grow
obese, their health suffers, they may die prematurely. None of this is good . . . . What should be
done about it? What about criminalizing it? . . . This is crazy . . . . The problem is not large
enough to warrant such extreme infringements of liberty.” DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS! THE
CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS vii-viii (2002). In sum, since 1969, government-appointed
commissions in the United States, Canada, England, Australia, and the Netherlands concluded, after
reviewing the scientific evidence, that marijuana’s dangers had previously been greatly exaggerated,
and urged lawmakers to drastically reduce or eliminate penalties for marijuana possession. See
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, CANNABIS (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
1969); CANADIAN GOVERNMENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS
(Information Canada 1970); MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE (Nixon-Shafer Report) (GPO 1972); WERKGROEP
VERDOVENDE MIDDELEN, BACKGROUND AND RISKS OF DRUG USE (Staatsuigeverij 1972); DRUG
PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIA-AN INTOXICATED SOCIETY, SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL
WELFARE (Australian Government Publishing Service 1977).
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of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”51—provides some
guidance. Sometimes, after all, we can justifiably claim that a given
right is embedded in American traditions and conscience. Indeed, bodily
autonomy is a good example. Beyond its reflection in the Fourth
Amendment,52 leading Anglo-American political theory,53 and the
statutory law of alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, and fatty foods, “a right of
control over one’s body has deep roots in the common law.”54 As the
Supreme Court observed over a century ago, “no right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”55 As Justice Cardozo later wrote,
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body.”56 Under the
“historical roots” aspect of the traditional approach, then, bodily
autonomy is plausibly a fundamental right even before we turn to the
most recent case law.
The second part of the traditional approach, we saw, is the demand
for a “careful description” of the asserted right. This brings us the other
strand of the Court’s search for fundamental rights—the autonomy

51. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
52. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . shall not be violated . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
53. In the eighteenth century, Jefferson asserted that “the legitimate powers of government
extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.” Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in
JEFFERSON: HIS POLITICAL WRITINGS 36 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955). In the nineteenth century,
expanding Jefferson’s insight into his famous “harm principle,” Mill wrote that “the only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (G. Himmelfarb,
ed., 1869) (emphasis added). In the twentieth century, Rawls wrote that “the equal basic liberties
(include) the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity (physical and psychological)
of the person.” JF, supra note 30, at 44 (emphasis added).
54. Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
55. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). This is plain, for example, in
tort and criminal law. The protection against unwanted physical contact is reflected in such crimes
as assault, battery, rape, and kidnapping, as well as in associated intentional torts like false
imprisonment. As the Tenth Circuit recently wrote, “nonconsensual sexual contact . . . by its very
nature evinces a clear intention to disregard the victim’s dignity and bodily autonomy . . . .” United
States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d
1113, 1120 (10th Cir. 1999)). For centuries, thus, the common law has provided redress for
invasion of bodily autonomy. It is even protected in unintentional torts like negligence and strict
liability.
56. Schloenforff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914).
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strand, embodied in Lawrence v. Texas,57 as it refines the careful
description requirement. While Lawrence created no fundamental
rights, one scholar has observed that
Lawrence emphasized . . . that the precise framing of a right ought not
to be conflated with the narrowest and most concrete definition of the
conduct the state seeks to punish; the appropriate level of generality
may require a broader understanding of the asserted interest . . . . On
the one hand, framing must not be overly narrow . . . . On the other
hand, framing must not be so broad that the scope of substantive due
process becomes limitless . . . . 58

By these lights, bodily autonomy defined as control over the
borders and contents of one’s body, particularly within the home,59
measures up well under Lawrence. It is not too broad, to begin, as it
specifies concrete limits on the autonomy protected by the right. It
literally protects a private physical space within a private physical space.
It is thus not nearly as broad as “autonomy” or “liberty” or “privacy” or
“the pursuit of happiness.”60
Conversely, bodily autonomy is not too narrow under Lawrence. It
does not, like Mallan and other cases, define the right at stake merely as
smoking marijuana. Lawrence, after all, was clear that the right at stake
there was not simply that of engaging in sexual conduct.61 There is no
fundamental right to smoke cigarettes either, but a sudden federal
prohibition of tobacco would certainly be subject to strict scrutiny.
On this preliminary basis, bodily autonomy is plausibly a
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet a key
advantage to framing the right at stake in marijuana prohibition as bodily
autonomy is that it is stated broadly enough to have substantial roots in,
and thus draw meaningful guidance from, the Court’s leading relevant

57. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
58. Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of
Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1987-88 (2005).
59. Justice Kennedy underscores this point, referring to “the most private of places, the
home.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. As Laurence Tribe describes Kennedy’s opinion, “the Court
was protecting the right of adults to define for themselves the borders and contents of deeply human
relationships.” Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1915 (2004) (emphasis added). While marijuana
prohibition and anti-sodomy laws do not present identical constitutional questions, the concepts of
“borders and contents” are useful in understanding the autonomy at stake in both.
60. See People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 133 (1972) (Kavanagh, J., concurring).
61. See 539 U.S. at 567. While Lawrence, to be sure, protected a relational autonomy, this
certainly included a bodily autonomy, specifically, for Mr. Lawrence, the right to decide whether, in
the privacy of the home, to have another man’s penis inside his body.
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case law, especially that of liberty due process. To reinforce the status
of bodily autonomy as a fundamental right, rendering marijuana
prohibition subject to strict scrutiny, we thus now turn to a brief review
of that jurisprudence. We shall take the cases according to the strength
of the state interest asserted, beginning with those in which it is strongest
and proceeding toward those in which it is weakest. While no right
except freedom of thought is absolute, the portrait that will emerge is
that of a strong presumption in favor of liberty as bodily autonomy.
2. The Presumption in Favor of Bodily Autonomy
Our starting point is the right to die cases, Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dept. of Health62 and Glucksberg. In Cruzan, a young woman
was rendered vegetative in a car accident and eventually taken to a state
hospital.63 Once it was apparent that she had virtually no chance of
regaining her mental faculties, her parents asked employees of the
hospital to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures
keeping her alive.64 The employees refused to do so without court
approval, and the case went to the Supreme Court.65
On the one hand, the Court held, the State’s compelling interest in
preserving life entitles it to require clear and convincing proof of a
patient’s wish to discontinue life saving procedures before honoring that
wish.66 On the other hand, assuming such proof is made, the Court
affirmed the Fourteenth Amendment right of such a patient, based on his
interest in bodily autonomy, to refuse the treatment.67 Quoting an old
precedent, the Court observed that “no right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.”68
Glucksberg involved a State ban on physician-assisted suicide, even
for terminally ill and suffering patients.69 Among the reasons for the
ban, Washington asserted a compelling interest in preserving human

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 262, 286.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 269 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
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life.70 Writing for the Court, and grounding his decision in a historical
and comparative analysis of the law of suicide, Chief Justice Rehnquist
ruled for the State.71 He held that the individual right asserted was not
fundamental and that the ban was subject to rational basis scrutiny,
which it could satisfy.72 Yet three points are in order. First, although it
did not prevail in Cruzan, the interest in preserving human life, at least
in the abstract, is the most compelling of all state interests. All other
public interests assume the preservation of human life, and so a State is
on strong ground where it can plausibly assert this interest. Second, a
key reason Rehnquist rejected the right claimed in Glucksberg is that,
unlike the right claimed in Cruzan, it amounted to a right to coerce a
third person (doctor) to administer a lethal dose to a patient.73 Whatever
else one thinks of this ruling, an adult’s liberty to consume marijuana in
his home does not remotely involve such third party coercion.
Concurring in Glucksberg, thirdly, Justice Stevens wrote that “in most
cases, the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in his or her
own physical autonomy, including the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, will give way to the state’s interest in preserving human
life.”74 While the Glucksberg Court thus ruled for the State, Stevens
expressly recognized the constitutionally protected status of bodily
autonomy.75 This implies a different outcome where a law violates
bodily autonomy yet government can claim no plausible interest in
preserving life. As we shall see, the state interests asserted in most
bodily autonomy cases are not of this magnitude. Whatever the weight
of the State’s interest in preserving life in other circumstances, then, it is
diminished in the case of a deeply comatose or terminal and suffering
individual for the same reason and to the same degree as that
individual’s interest in refusing lifesaving medicine is enhanced.76 Thus
far, then, even when the state interest in invading bodily autonomy is
strongest, the cases go both ways.

70. Id. at 703.
71. Id. at 702.
72. See id. at 734.
73. As the Chief Justice framed the issue, “the question before us is whether the “liberty”
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
74. Id. at 742 (Stevens, J., concurring); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2306 (1997) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
75. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 743 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 743-44.
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We come next to Jacobson v. Massachusetts,77 Schmerber v.
California,78 and Winston v. Lee.79 In these cases, States asserted
interests in preventing serious threats to, or punishing serious breaches
of, public safety and welfare. In Jacobson, a town required the
inoculation of all residents against smallpox.80 Jacobson was fined when
he refused to be inoculated, and he challenged this fine under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.81 In Schmerber, the
petitioner had been in a car accident and appeared intoxicated to police
when he arrived at a hospital.82 In order to preserve any evidence of his
intoxication for purposes of prosecution, they directed a hospital
employee to take a blood sample from Schmerber over his objection.83
A blood sample analysis disclosing a high blood alcohol level was
introduced against him at trial, and he objected on Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds.84
The Court held for the State in both cases, and this is not surprising.
For one thing, the state interest in invading bodily autonomy was
compelling in both cases: smallpox was a fatal threat to public health
and safety in 1905,85 and drunken driving remains so today. For another
thing, the degree of state intrusion into bodily autonomy was relatively
limited in both cases. A smallpox inoculation may be more intrusive
than the extraction of blood, if only because something is being forced
into the body rather than taken out. Yet neither is on a par with the
forced feeding of a comatose or terminal suffering patient.86 While
77. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
78. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
79. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
80. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 13.
81. Id.
82. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 759.
85. Smallpox killed an estimated 60 million Europeans, including five reigning
European monarchs, in the 18th century alone. Up to 30% of those infected, including
80% of the children under 5 years of age, died from the disease, and one third of the
survivors became blind. Smallpox was responsible for an estimated 300–500 million
deaths in the 20th century. As recently as 1967, the World Health Organization (WHO)
estimated that 15 million people contracted the disease and that two million died in that
year. After successful vaccination campaigns throughout the 19th and 20th centuries,
the WHO certified the eradication of smallpox in 1979. To this day, smallpox is the only
human infectious disease to have been completely eradicated from nature.
N. Barquet & P. Domingo, Smallpox: The Triumph Over the Most Terrible of the Ministers of
Death, in ANN. 127 INTERN. MED. 635, 635-42 (1997); Smallpox Factsheet, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/smallpox/en/index.html.
86. Accord Niebla v. County of San Diego, No. 90-56302, 1992 US App LEXIS 15049 (9th
Cir. June 23, 1992), in which a State’s interest in protecting a person from serious health problems
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Jacobson and Schmerber are sound, then, they neither lessen the force of
Cruzan nor control cases in which state interests are of a lesser
magnitude than that in protecting and preserving life.87
In Winston v. Lee, by contrast, the Commonwealth of Virginia
claimed that a bullet lodged under Lee’s collarbone would help prove
that he had committed an armed robbery.88 It thus sought a court order
forcing him to undergo surgery to remove the bullet.89 The Supreme
Court ruled, however, that Lee’s interest in avoiding invasive surgery
outweighed the state interest in violating his bodily autonomy.90 While
Virginia could claim a state interest on a par with those in Jacobson and
Schmerber, thus, the gravity of Lee’s interest in avoiding the bodily
intrusion in question far exceeded those in the earlier cases. Because
Virginia had other, if less incriminating, evidence with which to
prosecute, it is not surprising that Lee prevailed.91 Thus far, once again,
the cases go both ways, even where state interests are compelling.
We come next to the abortion cases, in which States have claimed
an interest in protecting potential human life. Given the importance of
preserving human life generally, Roe v. Wade92 and Planned Parenthood
v. Casey93 took seriously the State interest in protecting fetal human life
(and maternal health). Nonetheless, Roe ruled for the individual,
establishing a woman’s presumptive94 constitutional right to obtain an
abortion. Casey, in turn, reinforced the core of that right, expressly
recognizing “the two more general rights under which the abortion right
is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical
autonomy.”95 As in Winston, then, the principle of bodily autonomy
prevailed in the abortion cases, even over substantial state interests.
Thus far, we have reviewed cases involving important state
interests. Yet not all state interests are of this magnitude. In City of

by forced blood transfusion outweighed her interest in bodily autonomy. This case involved a child,
however. Likewise, see Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1266 (1985), which upheld an Ohio
law requiring public school children to be immunized against specific diseases.
87. In Jacobson and Schmerber, it should be noted, the claim of governmental authority was
based not on the federal commerce power, as with the CSA, but rather on the state police power.
88. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 753 (1985).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 767.
91. It is notable that Lee sought not to keep out of his body what he did not want, or even to
put into his body what he did want, but to keep in what he wanted in.
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
94. As Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 162-64, and Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76 make clear, the abortion
right is time-, place-, and manner-limited.
95. 505 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added).
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Indianapolis v. Edmond,96 police had conducted suspicionless searches
at highway roadblocks for the sole purpose of drug interdiction, and
these were challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds. In the past, the
Court had spoken of a “fundamental public interest in implementing the
criminal law.”97 Writing for the Edmond Court, further, Justice
O’Connor called drug trafficking a serious problem.98 Nonetheless, she
held that the state interest in drug interdiction is simply a species of the
“general interest in crime control,”99 and thus could not justify the
governmental action at issue.
This is a key distinction, reiterated in later decisions.100 Whether or
not they prevailed, the State interests asserted in Glucksberg, Cruzan,
Jacobson, Schmerber, and Winston were all compelling interests, i.e.,
more substantial than the mere general interest in crime control. By
contrast, O’Connor is clear in Edmond that the while the State interest in
drug interdiction may be legitimate, it is not compelling, and so would
not satisfy strict scrutiny.101
We come then to Rochin v. California.102 Here, police witnessed
the defendant, in his bedroom, swallow two capsules they reasonably
believed were illegal contraband.103 Unable to make him disgorge them,
they took him to a hospital and had his stomach forcibly pumped in
order to retrieve the evidence.104 As Justice Frankfurter wrote, such
conduct “shocks the conscience,”105 violating the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.106 Forcible stomach pumping, of course, is a
far greater bodily intrusion than is a forced inoculation or blood
extraction. Yet Rochin implicitly recognized what Justice O’Connor
confirmed in Edmond—that the state interest in enforcing drug
prohibition generally (and marijuana prohibition in particular) is far less

96. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
97. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560-61 (1978).
98. It is notable, however, that she never distinguished cannabis from drugs like cocaine and
heroin, and never spoke to whether state marijuana regulation would reduce rather than increase
drug trafficking.
99. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
100. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 424 (2005); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,
424 (2004); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001).
101. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
102. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
103. Id. at 166.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 172.
106. In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Rochin for the proposition that “the “liberty”
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes (the right) to bodily integrity . . . .” 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997).
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substantial than that in preventing influenza or securing proof of drunk
driving. Under current U.S. law, thus, it is not a compelling interest.
We come at last to cases in which government has no plausible
interest, not even a legitimate one, in invading bodily autonomy. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,107 claiming an interest in preventing human
conception,108 the State had banned the sale or use of contraceptive
devices, even for married couples in the privacy of the home.109 By
contrast to the abortion context, in which there is arguably a substantial
state interest in protecting a human fetus,110 there is no such interest
where conception has not yet occurred.111 Indeed, given the crisis of
human overpopulation, there is no legitimate state interest in preventing
conception, far less a compelling one. If abortion or unwanted children
are to be avoided, then available contraception for those who want it is
not just sound public policy, it is urgent. The Court thus quite
reasonably invalidated the statute.112
Finally, of course, we come to Lawrence v. Texas.113 Here, a state
law had criminalized homosexual sodomy,114 even by consenting adults
in the privacy of the home.115 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
finessed the question whether the individual has a fundamental right for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes to engage in such conduct.116 Yet this
did not change the outcome, for even applying rational basis scrutiny,
Kennedy wrote that “the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual.”117 As Professor Barnett has argued, Lawrence
established a “presumption of liberty” where adults act peacefully in the
privacy of their homes.118
107. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
108. Id. at 498.
109. Id. at 480.
110. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
111. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
112. See id. at 479. Not all Justices in the majority joined Douglas’ reliance on “penumbras”
from the Bill of Rights, yet all recognized the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as a
source of the liberty at stake.
113. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 562-63.
116. See id. at 567; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) had held that no such
fundamental right existed.
117. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
118. Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 35-37 (2002-2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2003/
revolution.pdf. This is consistent with Rawls’ proviso that liberty may only be restricted for the sake
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Summing up, States have prevailed in bodily autonomy cases
where they have sought to protect post-natal life,119 prevent the spread of
influenza,120 and secure essential proof of serious crimes.121 These
rulings are consistent with Rawls’ equal liberty principle, which requires
that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all.”122 It is thus striking that, by contrast, even a state interest
as strong as that in protecting fetal life mostly yielded to the individual
liberty interest in the abortion cases.123 Accordingly, where a State’s
interest in invading bodily autonomy is weak or nonexistent, e.g., in
preventing conception (Griswold),124 punishing private consensual adult
sodomy (Lawrence),125 or punishing the ingestion of drugs in the privacy
of the home (Rochin),126 the Court held for the individual.
Like most liberties, bodily autonomy is not absolute. Yet we can
now see that the President would have ample reason to agree that the
cases we have reviewed, forming “a coherent constitutional view over
the whole range of (the Court’s) decisions,”127 reflect a strong

of liberty. See TJ, supra note 24, at 186-93. It is noteworthy that the Eighteenth Amendment,
which banned the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating beverages, did not ban their
consumption. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. Such an omission implies the drafters’ recognition
that criminalizing ingestion would run so afoul of basic constitutional values as to risk a failure of
ratification if it were included in the amendment.
119. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
120. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 13 (1905)..
121. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966).
122. TJ, supra note 24, at 220 (emphasis added).
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
124. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125. 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). Let us not overlook that the liberty interest burdened by
marijuana prohibition is strikingly parallel to that which prevailed in Lawrence. Both cases deal
with the liberty of adults, not children, to decide what, in the exercise of autonomy and the pursuit
of happiness, shall be taken into the most private of all places, their bodies, in the second most
private of all places, their homes. On the latter point, the Court has written, “the Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed the ‘overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic’.” Oliver v. U. S.,
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1979)). See also Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Given the weak governmental interest in marijuana
prohibition, then, and the strong individual interest burdened by such prohibition, President Obama
would be inclined to conclude that it is unconstitutional under Edmond and Lawrence alone.
126. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, “due process of law requires an evaluation based on a
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science on a balanced order of facts exactly and
squarely stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, . . . on a judgment not ad hoc
and episodic, but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a
progressive society.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
127. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 235 (1993).
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presumption of liberty as bodily autonomy.128 Using this presumption as
a guidepost in assessing the constitutionality of marijuana prohibition,
he is already inclined to bring a skeptical eye to arguments in its
favor.129
C.

Complementary Theses

I have argued that marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny
because bodily autonomy, which marijuana prohibition burdens, is a
fundamental right. I now turn to three arguments which reinforce one or
both parts of this, my core jurisprudential thesis.
1. Justice as Regularity
The central command of the equal protection principle is that
government may not treat differently those who are similarly situated.130
Rawls calls this “justice as regularity,”131 and as the Court wrote in a
seminal case, “[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense . . . it has made as
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or
nationality for oppressive treatment.”132 More recently, it has observed,
“[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought
by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
128. By contrast, Obama knows that isolated cases like Gonzales v. Raich, which reject
longstanding precedent, see Carcieri, supra note 20, at 1136-46, lack the legitimacy of the Court’s
recognition, over the course of many years and many cases, of the presumption of liberty as bodily
autonomy. In passing, the President would reject any claim that, since the laws on the books are
often not enforced, the administration of U.S. marijuana prohibition does not violate due process.
As he understands, when law enforcement officials have complete discretion whether to enforce the
criminal law, this invites them to engage in the arbitrary, discriminatory treatment, often based on
race, that violates due process.
129. De Marneffe writes that “a person who is not free to use drugs for recreation is not
thereby denied due process of law.” Peter de Marneffe, Do We Have a Right to Use Drugs? 10
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 229, 235 (1996) (emphasis added). Because I do not apply strict
scrutiny to marijuana prohibition, I do not technically refute this claim. Yet de Marneffe makes this
assertion in passing, and so he does not remotely undermine my showing that the leading relevant
liberty due process cases establish a presumption of bodily autonomy. Even more telling, de
Marneffe later concedes that “I am inclined to support not only marijuana decriminalization, but
marijuana legalization as well.” DOUGLAS HUSAK & PETER DE MARNEFFE, THE LEGALIZATION OF
DRUGS: FOR AND AGAINST 180 (2005).
130. Since perfection can never be the standard for human institutions like government, this
rule must be understood as forbidding substantially dissimilar treatment for those who are
substantially similarly situated.
131. See TJ, supra note 24, at 207-08.
132. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
194 (1964) (emphasis added).
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intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”133 Obama
would thus take very seriously the principle that those with similar cases
must be treated similarly. Just as the state violates this principle when it
treats individuals arbitrarily based on race, it violates it where it imposes
a greater punishment on one person than it does on another for the same
or a lesser offense.134
Now we saw that there is substantial evidence that marijuana use is
less harmful than the use of alcohol and tobacco.135 Under current law,
then, it is not just that marijuana users are similarly situated to drinkers
and smokers, yet differently treated. The imbalance is greater than this,
for far from posing as much risk to genuine state interests as those who
drink and smoke, especially in public, private adult marijuana users pose
far less. Yet the latter are subject to criminal punishment while the
former are not. The President would be inclined to agree that such a
stark inconsistency is irrational and fundamentally unfair.136
2. Marijuana Prohibition and Suspect Classifications
Beyond this, secondly, we have seen that strict scrutiny is triggered
under the Fourteenth Amendment not only when a law burdens a
133. Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); See also Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. SotoLopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). This principle,
Judge Posner has observed, is a basic element of the economic theory of law: “To count as law, a
command … must treat equally those who are similarly situated in all respects relevant to the
command.” RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 393 (1972). Stated differently,
punishment for an exercise of liberty, to be rational, must be commensurate with the risk and/or
harm that that exercise of liberty actually poses to legitimate or compelling state interests. See, e.g.,
Douglas Husak, Do Marijuana Offenders Deserve Punishment?, in POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA AND
THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION 195-96 (Mitch Earleywine ed., 2007).
134. As Rawls rightly notes, the “similarly situated/differently treated” formulation does not
take us very far. See TJ, supra note 24, at 207-09. Standing alone, that is, it is not an argument, but
rather a label encapsulating an assertion of an equal protection violation. Like the harm principle
with regard to liberty, it provides only a starting point or roadmap for constitutional argument
regarding equality.
135. See supra note 50.
136. John Lovell, a lobbyist for the California Peace Officers’ Association and opponent of
Tax Cannabis 2010 asks, “what good comes of it? . . . . What is the good of adding another mindaltering substance?” Dave Ferrell, Weed Takes Root, SAN FRANCISCO WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 2010. The
answer is that Mr. Lovell simply ignores the equality dimension of constitutional law. He is trying,
in Rawlsian terms, to privilege the good over the right. The state, however, cannot simply declare
that it will punish some exercises of liberty but not others on grounds that some liberty is bad
enough, and more would be worse. If those who exercise one liberty pose a lesser threat of harm to
legitimate public interests than others, then the consistency at the heart of equal protection requires
that they be punished no more than those others. Otherwise, there is little to stop a state from
punishing, e.g., only one race for drinking alcohol or only one gender for smoking.
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fundamental right, but also when it uses a “suspect classification.”137
Race is the paradigm suspect classification, we saw, and the drug war’s
disparate impact on racial minorities in all phases of the criminal justice
system is well documented.138 Yet even if Obama had doubts that such
an impact embodies a suspect classification, he would find it hard to
disagree that U.S. marijuana prohibition has long been motivated largely
by racism. As Bonnie and Whitebread write, for example, based on their
“brief survey of marijuana prohibition in the western states, we have
concluded that its Mexican use pattern was ordinarily enough to warrant
its prohibition, and that whatever attention such legislative action
received was attended by sensationalist descriptions of crimes
committed by Mexican marijuana users.”139
As Sloman adds:
“the first users of marijuana—that is, the first people to smoke
cannabis for mostly recreational purposes—were members of minority
groups . . . . [S]tate after state enacted some form of prohibition
against the non-medical abuse of the drug. California in 1915, Texas
in 1919, Louisiana in 1924, New York by 1927—one by one most
states acted, usually when faced with significant numbers of Mexicans
or Negroes using the drug.”140

As Booth elaborates:
“the press and ‘concerned citizens’ took up the call, driven not only by
their zeal but also by their anti-Mexican attitudes, which were
strengthened during the Depression when jobs were scarce and
migrants seemed to be stealing work from the white work force. The
Mexicans were accused, without any justification, of spreading
marijuana across the nation. State marijuana laws were often used as
an excuse to deport or imprison innocent Mexicans . . . .”

Although they had been using marijuana for years, it was not until
1938 that [Federal Bureau of Narcotics Director Harry] Anslinger finally
came to realize the link between jazz musicians and the drug . . . . Once
the association dawned on him, he set about going after the
entertainment industry in general and jazz musicians specifically. They

137. See supra note 31.
138. See supra note 7.
139. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, “The Genesis of Marijuana Prohibition—
Rationale in the West: Class Legislation,” in The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An
Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1016
(1970), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/vlr/vlr2.htm.
140. Larry “Ratso” Sloman, Reefer Madness: A History of Marijuana 29-30 (1979).
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fitted nicely into his racist agenda: if they were not black, they were
whites who had come under and been corrupted by black influence . . . .
What had been considered a drug threat during the two world
wars—the German and, before and between the conflicts, the Chinese—
was now replaced by colored men, this jingoism heightened not only
because of the immigration situation but also by the American cant put
out since the 1930s by Anslinger and the FBN. Concern was not only
voiced about the fate of women in black hands: there was a worry that
the young might also come under their spell, this given credence by the
arrest, in August 1951, of the first white teenager found in possession of
marijuana. Cannabis, the black man’s narcotic, was widely regarded as
more dangerous than heroin or cocaine, not because of its potential for
addiction but for its facilitation of multi-racial sexual
communication.”141
Beyond the drug war’s racially disparate impact, then, there is
evidence that racism has long been a dominant motive behind U.S.
marijuana prohibition. Obama is thus justified in concluding not only
that it burdens a fundamental right, but also that it embodies a suspect
classification. He would thus likely agree that all roads of Fourteenth
Amendment analysis lead to a presumption against, i.e., strict scrutiny
of, marijuana prohibition.
3. Bodily Autonomy and Free Speech
Finally, while I have argued that my thesis has broad support in the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is reinforced by the analogy between bodily
autonomy and free speech. Rawls expressly includes both speech and
“the physical integrity of the person” among the basic liberties protected
by the equal liberty principle.142 Moreover, neither speech nor bodily
autonomy is a zero sum liberty.143 Unlike some forms of affirmative
action, for example, involving scarce, valuable resources, free speech
141. MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 178-79, 207, 229-30 (2003). As one writer
observes, “Anslinger’s appeal to racism and hysteria was unabashed.” Michael Vitiello,
Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 707, 749 (1998) (citing Richard L. Miller, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS
(1991)). Beyond interracial sex, Anslinger associated marijuana with deviant sex, insanity, and
communism. See Schlosser, supra note 14, at 20. See also Milton Friedman, There’s No Justice in
the War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998; Monroe Anderson, It’s Time to Legalize Marijuana
in Illinois, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006.
142. See TJ, supra note 24, at 53; JF, supra note 30, at 44.
143. A situation is characterized as zero-sum where “one side’s gain in every transaction is the
other side’s loss.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734 (1984).
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and bodily autonomy are not denied to some simply because extended to
others. While free speech is not absolute, then, the Court has come to
recognize the strongest of presumptions in its favor.144 Given the
analogy between bodily autonomy and free speech, two doctrines in
particular are illuminating.
The first is that of commercial speech. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co.145 and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,146 the Court held that
laws banning ads giving the public accurate information about retail
prices of alcoholic beverages violate the First Amendment. As great a
threat as such ads intuitively pose to public health and safety, that is,
government cannot prove that a given ad will proximately cause, e.g.,
domestic violence or a fatal car crash.147 Because liquor can be legally
purchased and consumed by adults, moreover, even in public, the Court
reinforced the presumption of liberty—even in the case of liquor ads.148
On this basis, Obama would be skeptical that private adult marijuana
use, unlike liquor ads, will proximately cause harms of the magnitude of
domestic violence or a fatal auto collision.
The second doctrine is that of incitement to imminent lawlessness,
the rule for which is stated in Brandenburg v. Ohio.149 There, a man was
convicted under a state criminal syndicalism statute for remarks he had
made at a Ku Klux Klan rally.150 In striking the law down, the Court
held that government may punish incitement to imminent lawlessness
only where it can show that the speech in question is both (1) directed
toward producing serious imminent harm to others and (2) likely to do
so.151 Two points are in order.
First, this rule recognizes the distinction, reflected elsewhere in free
speech law,152 between (1) the exercise of liberty and (2) its likely,
immediate, harmful effects on third parties, the latter being necessary to

144. As Justice Douglas observed, “free speech is the rule, not the exception.” Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW ch.1 (3d ed. 2007).
145. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
146. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
147. See Rubin, 514 U.S. 476; Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.
148. See id.
149. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
150. Id. at 444-45.
151. Id. at 447.
152. Examples include the law of bribery, fraud, obscenity, criminal conspiracy, and criminal
solicitation. See generally Gunther and Sullivan, supra note 144, ch.1.
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ban or punish the former.153 In light of the speech/bodily autonomy
analogy, then, the law governing bodily autonomy should reflect this
distinction as well. Before government can punish private adult
marijuana use, that is, it should have to prove, and not merely assert, any
substantial harms immediately caused by that exercise of liberty. If
private adult marijuana use causes no such harms, then it should no more
be punishable based on what may happen afterward than consumption of
alcohol can be punished based on the drunken driving that may later take
place.
Beyond this, secondly, application of the Brandenburg rule to
private adult marijuana use suggests that punishing this exercise of
liberty is even harder to justify than suppression of speech. Whatever
harms, if any, private adult marijuana use is likely to cause others, it
would be very difficult to show that it is directed to causing such harm.
Even a speaker at a public rally who desires and advocates that public
buildings be blown up is constitutionally protected if there is no
imminent threat that anyone will do as he says.154 In this light, Obama
would recognize the absurdity of any claim that private adult marijuana
users, in exercising their liberty, have any comparable malicious,
destructive intent.155
In sum, the parallel between bodily autonomy and free speech
reinforces the President’s basis for concluding that marijuana prohibition
is subject to strict scrutiny.156

153. Professor Sunstein, President Obama’s “Regulatory Czar,” has referred to “real danger of
public injury” as necessary to overcome the right to bear arms. See Cass Sunstein, The Most
Mysterious Right, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2007, at 42, 47.
154. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
155. Id.
156. Although it concerns a state constitutional privacy clause, a line of Hawaii Supreme Court
cases provides further authority for this claim. As Mallan notes, the Hawaii Supreme Court has
taken two approaches to interpreting Article I, section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution. The first
approach, the Mueller/Baehr approach, tracks the traditional approach to substantive due process of
Palko and Glucksberg, identified by Professor Post, supra note 40. The second approach is the
Stanley/Kam approach, through which Article I, section 6 establishes a fundamental right where an
individual views or reads pornographic material in his home. See Hawaii v. Mallan, 86 HAW. 440,
443-45 (1998). The court held that the combination of “the home as the situs of privacy” and the
fact that “freedom of speech and freedom of the press are strongly implicated” yielded a
constitutionally protected right. Id. at 444-45. Insofar as bodily autonomy is, like free speech, a
zero sum liberty, and since we are focused on the activities of adults in the privacy of the home,
Stanley/Kam provides doctrinal authority to reinforce the strong presumption against laws
burdening the bodily autonomy of adults in the privacy of the home.
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III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD RATIONAL AND JUST POLICY REFORM
Beyond its economic, social, and other constitutional difficulties, I
have argued, marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. I have supported this primarily by showing that
(1) bodily autonomy, which is directly burdened by marijuana
prohibition, is plausibly a fundamental right, and (2) the Court’s leading
relevant case law has established a presumption in its favor. I have
endeavored to reinforce my thesis, further, by arguing that (1) marijuana
prohibition violates “justice as regularity,”157 (2) its racist origins satisfy
the suspect classification trigger of strict scrutiny, and (3) given the
analogy between free speech and bodily autonomy, the strong
presumption in favor of free speech should apply to bodily autonomy.
As noted, the application of strict scrutiny to marijuana prohibition
is the subject of another article, and indeed, complex litigation. Yet I
submit that Obama would have grave doubts that this prohibition could
pass an honest application of that rule. As a stark matter of precedent,
an adult woman has a limited right to expel a fetus from her body158 and
an adult man has a right in his home to have another man’s penis inside
his body.159 Both, moreover, have the right to eat, drink and smoke
themselves to death, even in public, contributing to serious social
problems like drunken driving, second hand smoke, and burdens on the
health care system. In this light alone, the President would find it hard
to identify a principled basis in equality or liberty for denying those
adults the right to consume marijuana in their homes.
Beyond constitutional law, finally, three key ideas in Rawls—
legitimate expectations, public reason, and overlapping consensus—
provide the President an even broader foundation for challenging
Congress to end this war. I conclude with them.
As for the first, Rawls writes that it is not the satisfaction of moral
desert, but rather legitimate expectations, that characterize a just
distributive scheme under a sound contract theory.160 From his
viewpoint as a citizen, then, while knowing he cannot expect perfection
from human institutions like government, the average person can
legitimately expect that the law will not be so irrational and inconsistent
as to criminalize the exercise of one liberty while other liberties, far

157. TJ, supra note 24, at 207-08.
158. See Roe v. Wade, 510 U.S. 113 (1973).
159. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
160. See TJ, supra note 24, at 273-77.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8

13_CARCIERI_WESTERN.DOCM

330

2/10/2011 2:04 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:303

more harmful, are merely regulated for reasons widely understood.161
From their viewpoints as citizens (and not merely economic agents),
those who profit from or are employed by the alcohol, tobacco,
pharmaceutical, and prison industries have no legitimate expectation that
private adult marijuana use will forever remain a crime simply so that
their profits and employment will be maintained. The social contract of
a reasonably just society, one worth passing onto their grandchildren,
would never include such a provision.
As for public reason, we have seen that Obama can give powerful
justifications for ending marijuana prohibition, justifications which those
in a constitutional democracy can accept in their capacity as citizens.162
We have seen, that is, that the President has support not only in policy
terms of cost/benefit analysis but also on constitutional grounds. To be
sure, authoritarian conservatives like William Bennett, 163 George
Will,164 Lou Dobbs165 and John Walters166 may never change their
minds, having declared the war on marijuana one in which we can never
surrender. Yet some are incapable of public reason. As Freeman writes,
“there is no presumption that Social Darwinists, fundamentalists, neoNazis, or Southern slaveholders would be amenable to public reason, nor
should any effort be made to accommodate their views.”167 Moreover,
these drug warriors do not speak for all conservatives. Beyond such
persistent voices as those of William F. Buckley and Milton Friedman,
for example, the heroic dissents of Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist and
Thomas in Gonzales v. Raich show that some conservatives’ principled
commitment to federalism overcomes any misgivings they have about
liberal social policy.168
Yet let us even assume that all social conservatives are strongly
inclined toward marijuana prohibition. Unanimity is not needed for

161. Id.
162. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 212-53 (1993).
163. See William Bennett, No Retreat, No Surrender; President Bush Signals a Renewed
Offensive on Several Fronts in the Languishing War on Drugs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May
20, 2001, at G1.
164. See George Will, This War is Worth Fighting, WASH. POST, June 16, 2005, at A29.
165. See Lou Dobbs, A War Worth Fighting, THE WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at A12.
166. See John P. Walters, No Surrender: the Drug War Saves Lives, NAT’L REV., Sept. 27,
2004.
167. Samuel Freeman, Introduction, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 40 (S.
Freeman ed., 2003). Moreover, sweeping claims that marijuana must be illegal because it is
immoral and undermines excellence contradict Rawls’ fundamental principle that in a just society,
the right is prior to the good. See TJ, supra note 24, at 288-89.
168. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 43-75 (O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
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reform, and whatever their differences, the hard left, moderate left, and
moderate right all value individual liberty, particularly autonomy in the
privacy of the home. In Rawlsian terms, there is substantial overlapping
consensus here, building by the day.169 It will be even stronger if any of
the states with current plans for Proposition 19-like initiatives in 2012
enact them into law, and if the President can use his political skills and
capital in his second term to convince those conservatives who respect
cost/benefit analysis and constitutional principle. As the President
knows, some of them do.
By 2013, I conclude, support for ending federal marijuana
prohibition will have reached a tipping point. Since Congress will not
lead on this issue, it will have to follow.

169. See supra notes 5-6.
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